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[L. A. No. 28159. In Bank. Apr. 10, 1956.] 
CHRISTINE J. ALBERTSON, Appellant, v. JOSEPH 
RABOFF, Respondent. 
[1] Libel and Slander-Slander of Title-Pleading-Effect of Ap-
Peal in Prior Action.-Where plainti1l appealed in a prior 
action, only from that part of a judgment which made a money 
award to defendant, and such part was severable from the 
part which determined that defendant hod no interest in or 
right to a lien on plaintitrs real property, the part )f the judg-
ment unappealed from became fbial 60 days after the date 
thereof (Rules on Appeal, rule 2(e», and plaintiff's complaint 
for disparagement of title, filed after expiration of such 60-
day period, was not premature notwithstanding that her appeal 
from the judgment in the prior action was still pending. 
[2] ld.-Slander of Title-Privilege.-Although the gravamen of 
an action for disparagement of title is di1lerent from that of 
an action for personal defamation, substantially the same 
privileges are recognized in relation to both torts, in the 
absence of statute, and questions of privilege in relation to 
both torts are now resolved in the light of Civ. Code, § 47. 
[8] ld.-Privileged Oommunications-Absolute Privilege.-Publi-
cations made in the course of a judicial proceeding are abso-
lutely privileged. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. 2.) 
[4] Judgments-Res Judicata-Persons Ooncluded.-Any one with 
actual notice of the pendency of a proceeding who acquires 
an interest in the property involved takes subject to any judg-
ment that may be rendered therein. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1908, 
subd.2.) 
[6] Lis Pendens-Purpose.-The sole purpose of recording a notice 
of lis pendens is to bind any person who may acquire an in-
terest in the realty involved by giving constructive notice of a 
proceeding affecting such property. 
[3] See Oal.Jm., Libel and Slander, § 36 et seq.; Am.Jur., Libel 
and Slander, § 125. 
[5] See Oal.Jm., Lis Pendens, § 1 et seq.; Am.Jur., Lis Pendens, 
§ 2 et seq. 
Kclt. Dig. References: [1] Libel and Slander, § 103(2); [2,8-10, 
12] Libel and Slander, § 102.5; [S,11] Libel and Slander, § 29(1); 
[4] Judgments, § 430; (5, 6] Lis Pendens, § 1; (7] Lis Pendens, 
§ 6; [IS] Malicious Prosecution, § 1; [14, 15] Malicious Prosecu-
tion, § 32; [16] Malicious Prosecution, § 10; [17] Judgments, § 406. 
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[6] Id.-Nature.-A notice of lis pendens is purely incidental to 
the action wherein it is filed; it refers specifically to such 
action and has no existence apart from it. 
[7] Id.-E1rect.-Since the effect of a lis pendens is to gi4'e con-
structive notice of nIl the facts apparent on the face of the 
pleadings and of those other facts of which the facts so stated 
necessarily put a purchaser on inquiry, the recordation of a 
notice of lis pendens is in effect a republication of the plead-
ings. 
[8] Libel and Slander-Sla.nder of Title-Privilege.-Where dis-
paragement of title arises from the recordation of a notice of 
lis pendens as well as from the pleadings, both publication of 
the pleadings and the republication thereof by recording a 
notice of lis pendens are clothed with absolute privilege. 
[9] ld.-Slander of Title-Privilege.-Recordation of a notice of 
lis pet!dens is entitled to absolute privilege because the purpose 
of Civ. Code, § 47, is to afford litigants the utmost freedom 
of access to the courts to secure and defend their rights with-
out fear of being harassed by actions for defamation, and be-
cause subd. 4 of thllt code section extends the }Jrivilege to 
reports of judicial proceedings in public journals. (Disap-
proving West Investment Co. v. Moorhead, 120 Cal.App.2d 
837, 840, 841, 262 P.2d 322.) 
[10] ld.-Slander of Title-Privilege.-The privilege conferred by 
Civ. Code, § 47, applies to any publication, such as the recorda-
tion of a notice of lis pendens, that is required or permitted by 
law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the 
objects of the litigation, though the publication is made out-
side the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is 
invoked. 
[11] ld.-Privileged Communications-Absolute Privilege.-If a 
publication within the privilege conferred by Civ. Code, § 47, 
has a reasonable relation to the action and is permitted by law, 
the absolute privilege attaches. 
[12] ld.-Slander of Title-Privilege.-An absolute privilege at-
taches to the recordation of a notice of lis pendens, since 
such a publication is permitted by law and, like other docu-
ments that mlly be filed in an action, it has a reasonable rela-
tion thereto, and it is immaterial that it is recorded with the 
county recorder instead of being filed with the county clerk. 
(Disapproving statement in Gudger v. Manton, 21 Ca1.2d 537, 
545,134 P.2d 217, that "The levy of a writ of execution is not 
an act in the course of a judicial proceeding.") 
[13] Ma.licious Prosecution-Availability of Action.-The faet a 
communication may be absolutely privileged for the purposes 
of a defamation action does not prevent its being an element 
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of an action for malicious l'rosecution in a proper ease, since 
the policy of encouraginj;' fl't'E' arcess to the courts that under-
lies the absolute privilcj:'( applicable in defamation actions 
is outweighed by the poli<'~ of affording redress for individual 
wrongs when the requir(,l~~t'nts of favorable termination, lack 
of probable cause and nlll~i,~ are satisfied. 
[14] ld. - Pleading - Want (If Probable Cause.-Since probable 
cause requires a reasouahk bE-lief in the validity of the claim 
asserted, allegations that AU artion was prosecuted with knowl. 
edge of the falsity of th(' ~laim are a sufficient statement of 
lack of probable cause. 
[16] ld.-Pleading-Malice.- The requirement of malice is suffi-
ciently pleaded in an a<"lIm for malicious prosecution where 
the existence of malice i$ f'xpressly alleged and where there 
are also allegations that 4\ rlaim to the property involved was 
asserted with knowledgt' \,t· its falsity. 
[16] ld.-Malice.-The malit't' required in an action for malicious 
prosecution is not limitt',l to actual hostilty or ill will toward 
plaintiff but exists wht'll the proceedings are instituted pri-
marily for an improper 1'\\I·pose. 
[17] Judgmen~Res . JudiCAta-Findings 'Unneces&aI7 and Im-
materia.l.-Findings on \lIIUl'ct'ssary and immaterial issues are 
not conclusive in a subsl''l\ll'nt action between the same parties. 
APPEAL from a judglll~nt of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Louis ll. Burke, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for slander of til1f1. Judgment of dismissal reversed. 
Charles Murstein and A 'bert E. Wheatcroft for Appellant. 
Paul R. Hutchinson am' O. L. Gardner for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In ]!1.J8 defendant brought an action 
against plaintiff in which he Bought a money judgment and 
either a lien on real properly owned by plaintiff or a judgment 
declaring that her title wn~' obtained from her husband with· 
out consideration and ill fraud of creditors. Defendant re-
corded a notice of pendenry of this action in the county record· 
er's o~ce of the county ill which the real property is located. 
[14) Necessity and sum,·j"nr.y of allegations in complaint for 
malicious prosecution or tort action analogous thereto that 
defendant or defendants IIded without probable cause, note, 
14 A.L.R.2d 264. See all411 Oal.Jur., Malicious Prosecution, § 13; 
Am.Jur., Malicious Prosecut ion, § 116. 
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After a trial of the action, judgment was entered in favor of 
plaintiff on defendant's claims of a lien on or an interest in 
plaintiff's real property. Defendant did not appeal. Plain-
tiff appealed only from that part of the judgment awarding 
money to defendant, and that part of the judgment was 
affirmed. (Rabaf! v. Albertson, 122 Cal.App.2d 555 [265 P.2d 
139).) 
In the present action, plaintiff alleges that defendant knew 
at the time of filing his complaint in the prior action that he 
had no right to a lien on or an interest in her real property, 
that he nevertheless knowingly and maliciously asserted false 
claims thereto, and that by recording a notice of lis pendens 
he disparaged her title to her damage. The court sustained de-
fendant's objection to the introduction of evidence on the 
ground that the eomplaint did not state a cause of action 
(see Perry v. Futch, 119 Cal.App.2d 556,559 [259 P.2d 971]) 
and entered a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appeals. 
[1] Defendant contends that plaintiff's complaint herein 
was filed while her appeal from the judgment in the prior 
action was still pending and was therefore premature. In the 
prior action plaintiff appealed only from the part of the 
judgment that made an award of money to defendant. That 
part of the judgment was severable from the part that deter-
mined that defendant had no interest in or right to a lien upon 
plaintiff's real property. No appeal was taken from the latter 
part of the judgment, and it became final 60 days after the 
date thereof. (Rules on Appeal, rule 2(a); American Enter-
prise, Inc. v. Van Winkle, 39 Ca1.2d 210, 216 [246 P.2d 935] ; 
G. Ganahl Lbr. Co. v. Weinsveig, 168 Cal. 664, 667 [143 P. 
1025] ; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 362-363 [125 P. 904, 
Ann.Cas. 1913E 1319].) Plaintiff's complaint herein was 
filed after the time for appeal had expired and was therefore 
not premature. 
Defendant contends that the recordation of a notice of U, 
pendens is absolutely privileged and that therefore no cause 
of action for disparagement of title is stated. [2] Although 
the gravamen of an action for disparagement of title is differ-
ent from that of an action for personal defamation (CoZey v. 
Hecker,206 Cal. 22,27 [272 P. 1045] ; Smith v. Stuthman, 79 
Cal.App.2d 708, 709 [181 P.2d 123]), substantially the same 
privileges are recognized in relation to both torts in the absence 
of statute. (See Rest., Torts, §§ 585 et seq., 635 et seq.; Prosser, 
Torts, 2d ed. 767.) Questions of privilege relating to both 
torts are now resolved in the light of section 47 of the Civil 
) 
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Colle. [8] Thus, subdivision 2 of section 47 states the long-
established rule that publications made in the course of a 
judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged (GosewiscA v. 
Doran, 161 Cal. 511, 513-515 [119 P. 656, Ann.Cas. 1913D 
442] ; Donnell v. :uinforth, 11 Cal.App.2d 25, 28-29 [52 P.2d 
937]; Moore v. United States Fid. <t Guar. Co., 122 Cal.App. 
205,210 [9 P.2d 562J; Rest., Torts, §§ 685-639), and the ques-
tion presented therefore is whether a notice of lis pendem re-
corded as authorized by section. 409 olthe· Code of Civil Pro-
cedure· is a publication in the course of a judicial proceeding. 
[4] Anyone with actual notice of the pendency of the pro-
ceeding who acquires an interest in the property takes subject 
to any judgm~nt that may be rendered therein. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1908, subd. 2.) [6] The sole purpose of recording a 
notice of lis pendens is to secure the same result by giving con-
structive notice of the pendency of the proceeding. [8] Its 
effectiveness depends entirely on the action of which it is a 
part and to which it cal1s attention. It His purely incidental 
to the action wherein it is filed. It refers specifically to such 
action and has no existence apart from it." (Garcia v. 
Pinhero, 22 Cal.App.2d 194. 197 [70 P.2d 675}.) [7] Since 
, 'the effect of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of all 
the facts apparent upon the face of the pleadings, and of 
those other facts of which the facts so stated necessarily put a 
purchaser on inquiry .... " (Harris v. Whittier Bldg. ff Loan 
..4.88n., 18 Cal.App.2d 260, 266 [63 P.2d 840]), the recordation 
of a notice of lis penden8 is in effect a republication of the 
pleadings. [8] The disparagement of title arises, therefore, 
from the recordation of the notice of li8 pendens as well as 
from the pleadings. The publication of the pleadings is unques-
tionably clothed with absolute privilege, and we have con-
cluded that the repUblication thereof by recording a notice 
of lis pendens is similarly privileged. 
The recording of such a notice is expressly authorized by 
section 409 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which not only 
·"In an action affeeting the title or right of posaesaiOJl of real prop· 
erty, the plaintiff, at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant, 
at the time of 1I.ling hill answer, when aftirmative relief ill claimed in BUch 
anewer, or at any time afterwardB, may reeord in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which the property ill Bituated, a notice of the 
pendency of the action, containing the nameB of the parties, and the 
object of the action or defense, and a descriptiOJl of the property in that 
county affected thereby. From the time of 1I.ling wch notice for record 
only. shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby 
be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action. 
and 01117 of ita pendency apinBt parties designated by their real nam •• " 
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identifies the persons who may record the notice and speeifies 
the place of recordation and the time it may be made, but 
specifies that it may be done" in an action." The Legislature 
apparently regarded the recordation authorized in section 409 
of the Code of Civil Procedure as being made ~'in a judicial 
proceeding" within the meaning of section 47 of the Civil 
Code, for any publication" in an action" is unquestionably" in 
a judicial proceeding." [9] We do not rest our opinion, how-
ever, on the narrow ground that the word "in" is used in both 
sections or that the use of that word is of decisive significance, 
but on the'obvious purpose of section 47 to afford litigants the 
utmost freedom of access to the courts to secure and defend 
their rights without fear of being harassed by actions for 
defamation. (See Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: 
Judicial Proceedings, 9 Columb.L.Rev. 463, 469.) It would 
be anomalous to hold that a litigant is privileged to make a 
pUblication necessary to bring an action but that he can be 
sued for defamation if he lets anyone know that he has 
brought it (see Thompson V. White, 70 Cal. 135, 136 [11 P. 
564]), particularly when he is expressly authorized by statute 
to let all the world know that he has brought it. Furthermore, 
subdivision 4 of section 47 of the Civil Code extends the privi-
lege to reports of judicial proceedings in public journals. It 
cannot reasonably be held that the Legislature meant to ac-
cord such journals a greater immunity for giving actual notice 
of a proceeding to their numerous readers than that accorded 
litigants for giving the constructive notice thereof that the 
Legislature has authorized them to give. 
Relying on West Inv. Co. V. Moorhead, 120 Cal.App.2d 837, 
840-841 [262 P.2d 322]), plaintiff contends that the recorda-
tion of a notice of Us pendens is merely a "private act under-
taken dehors the judicial proceeding for the purpose of calling 
to the attention of all the world the pendency of litigation 
aifecting the designated real property" and is not "in" a 
judicial proceeding for" [N] 0 function of the court or its offi-
cers is invoked; no machinery associated with the judicial 
process is set in motion." By stressing the word "in" this 
contention would limit the privilege to the pleadings and the 
subsequent communications of the judge, counsel, jurors, 
parties, and witnesses in the actual course of the proceeding. 
Since we do not believe that the privilege is so limited, West 
Inv. Co. v. Moorhead, supra, is disapproved. 
[10] It is our opinion that the prh'i1l:'ge applies to any 
publication, such as the recordation of a notice of lis pendens, 
) 
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that is required (e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 749) or permitted 
(e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 409) by law in the course of a judicial 
proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though 
the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function 
of the court or its officers is invoked. (See 53 C.J.S., Libel and 
Slander, § 104, p. 168.} Thus, it is not limited to the plead-
ings, the oral or written evidence, to publications in open court 
or in briefs or affidavits. [11] If the publication has a rea-
sonable relation to the action and is permitted by law, the 
absolute privilege attaches. (See Rest., Torts, § 587 ; Youmans 
v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 220 [47 N.E. 265]; Kraushaar v: Lavin, 
39 N.Y.S.2d 880, 882-883; Zirn v. Cullom, 63 N.Y.S.2d 439, 
440-441; Inselberg v. Trosty, 190 Misc. 507 [77 N.Y.S.2d 457, 
458; ct. 39 A.L.R.2d 840-861.) [12] It therefore attaches to the 
recordation of a notice of lis pendens, for such a publication is 
permitted by law, and like other documents that may be filed 
in an action, it has a reasonable relation thereto and it is im-
material that it is recorded with the county recorder instead 
of being filed with the county clerk. 
Gudger v. Manton, 21 Ca1.2d 537 [134 P.2d 217], on which 
the court in West Inv. Co. v. Moorhead, supra, 120 Cal.App.2d 
837, relied, involved an action for slander of title for the 
wron~ful recordation and levy of a writ of execution against 
the property of a person who was not a party to the action. 
The original judgment was obtained against the wife for a 
premarital tort. The writ of execution, however, was recorded 
and levied against her husband's separate property and had 
no reasonable relation to the action against the wife. The 
statement in the opinion in that case that "The levy of a writ 
of execution is not an act in the course of a judicial proceed-
ing" (21 Ca1.2d at 545) was unnecessary to the decision 
therein and is disapproved. 
Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22 [272 P. 1045], on which the 
court in the West Inv. Co. case, supra, also relied, involved an 
action for slander of title in which the plaintiff alleged that 
after he had taken an appeal from the judgment of the San 
Francisco Superior Court and filed a stay bond approved by 
the court, defendant maliciously filed an abstract of judgment 
with the county recorder of San Joaquin County for the pur-
pose of slandering the title of plaintiff's bmds in that county. 
The defendant sought a cbange of venue, but the court held 
that slander of title is an injury to renl property and the venue 
of an action therefor was in the county where the property is 
-) 
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situated. Thus, the issue in that ease was simply one of venue 
and it was unnecessary to consider the question of privilege. 
Plaintiff contends that her complaint states a cause of action 
for malicious prosecution. [13] It may be noted at the out-
set that the fact that a communication may be absolutelypriv-
ileged for the purposes of a defamation action does not prevent 
its being an element of an action for malicious prosecution in 
a proper case. The policy of encouraging free access to the 
courts that underlies the absolute privilege applicable in defa-
mation actions is outweighed hy the policy of affording redress 
for individual wrongs when the requirements of favorable 
termination, lack of probable cause, and malice are satisfied. 
(See Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal.2d 146, 159-160 [114 P.2d 335, 135 
A.L.R. 775] ; Metzenbaum v. Metzenba1lm, 121 Cal.App.2d 64, 
68 [262 P.2d 596] ; 3 Rest., Torts, p. 380, Introductory note; 
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceed-
ings, 9 Columb.L.Rev. 463, 470.) 
.As indicated above, that part of the judgment in the 
former action that determined that defendant had no interest 
in or a right to a lien upon plaintiff's real property is now 
final and constitutes a termination of that separable part of 
the proceeding favorable to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff also alleges that "defendant herein well knew of 
the fact that he .•. was making unfounded and untrue state-
ments as to the transfer and conveyance of said real property 
or any part or portion thereof, but that thereafter and not-
withstanding the notice by plaintiff's attorney hereinabove 
mentioned, the defendant persisted in filing amended com-
plaints ... , in all of which, he, the said defendant, continued 
to assert claims falsely and maliciously in and to the aforemen-
tioned real property," and that "at the times herein men-
tioned, the defendant herein well knew that he . . • had no 
right, title, estate or intere..crt; in or to the aforementioned real 
property or any part or portion thereof ..•• " 
[14] Since probable cause requires a reasonable belief in 
the validity of the claim asserted {Franzen v. Shenk, 192 
Cal. 572, 578 [221 P. 932] ; Vann v. McOreary, 77 Cal. 434 
[19 P. 826]; see Rest., Torts, § 662, com. c, § 675, com. 
d}, the allegations that the action was prosecuted with 
knowledge of the falsity of the claim aJ;'e a sufficient state-
ment of lack of probable cause. {See Pulvermacher v. Los 
Angeles Ooordinating Oommittee, 61 ~a1.App.2d 704, 707 
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218 Ala. 158 [117 So. 668, 669J ; Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289, 
294-295 [11 Am.Rep. 10] ; anno., 14 A.L.R.2d 264, 298-299.) 
[15] The requirement of malice is also sufficiently pleaded. 
Not only is the existence of malice expressly alleged, but the 
allegations that a claim to the property was asserted with 
knowledge of its falsity also meets that requirement. [16] The 
malice required in an action for malicious prosecution is not 
limited to actual hostility or ill will toward plaintiff but 
exists when the proceedings are instituted primarily for an 
improper purpose. (See Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal.2d 489, 
495 [289 P.2d 794] ; Prosser on Torts [2d ed.] p. 666; ct. 
Brewer v. Second Baptist Ohurch, 32 Cal.2d 791, 797 [197 
P .2d 713].) It has been pointed out that the .. principal 
situations in which the civil proceedings are initiated for an 
improper purpose are those in which (1) the person initiating 
them does not believe that his claim may be held valid; (2) 
the proceedings are bcgun primarily because of hostility or 
ill will; (3) the proceedings are initiated solely for the pur-
pose of depriving the person against whom they are initiated 
of a beneficial use of his property; (4) the proceedings are 
initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement which has 
no relation to the merits of the claim." (Rest., Torts, § 676, 
com. b; see also § 668, com. e.) Clearly a person who 
attempts to establish a claim to property knowing of its falsity 
can only be motivated by an improper purpose. Plaintiff con-
tends, also, that she has in effect alleged that defendant's pur-
pose in falsely asserting an interest in the property and filing 
the lis pendens was to secure the benefit of an attachment 
to secure the payment of the money judgment without in-
curring the burdens thereof. There are no express allega-
tions of this purpose, however, and it is unnecessary to de-
cide whether evidence of such a purpose could be offered 
under a general allegation of a malicious motive. Since the 
judgment must be reversed, plaintiff will have an opportunity 
if she so wishes to amend her complaint expressly to allege 
that defendant's purpose in falsely claiming an interest in 
her property was to enable him improperly to secure the 
benefits of a Us pendens pending his securing of the money 
judgment. 
Plaintiff incorporated by reference and made a part of her 
complaint the findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
the judgment in the former proceeding. Defendant contends 
that these findings of fact conclusively establish that he had 
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probable cause for claiming an interest in plaintiff'8 prop~ 
erty and that therefore the allegations of the complaint to 
the contrary must be disregarded. The findings in the former 
action recite that defendant lent plaintiff's husband $7,500 
to enable him to purchase the real property involved in this 
action. Title was taken by plaintiff and her husband as joint 
tenants, and plaintiff succeeded to his interest on his death 
about 16 months later. In the meantime defendant asked 
plaintiff's husband to give him some evidence of the loan, 
and the latter delivered an instrument stating: "IOU 
$7,500.00. Lee Albertson. August 5th, 1946 on my house!' 
It was the intent and understanding of defendant and plain-
tiff's husband that the purpose of this writing was to en-
cumber the property with a lien in plaintiff's favor to secure 
the payment of the loan. The trial court found, however, 
that "said 1. O. U. is insufficient to create a lien on said real 
property. " 
In addition to asserting an interest in the property based 
on the I.O.U., defendant alleged that the original creation 
of the joint tenancy constituted a fraud on plaintiff's hus-
band's creditors on the ground that plaintiff's husband was 
insolvent at that time. The trial court found that the creation 
of the joint tenancy was not an assignment of property by 
plaintiff's husband within the meaning of the law governing 
fraudulent conveyances and therefore refrained from finding 
whether or not plaintiff's husband was insolvent at the time 
the joint tenancy was created. 
The money judgment against plaintiff was based on find-
ings that plaintiff was personally liable for the balance of 
the original loan and was affirmed on the theory that she 
had entered into a binding contract with defendant to dis-
charge her husband's debt. (Raboff v. Albertson, 122 Cal. 
App.2d 555 [265 P.2d 139].) 
It may be conceded that the findings with respect to the ' 
intent of defendant and plaintiff's husband to create a lien 
on the property by the I.O.U. would be sufficient to establish 
probable cause for the institution of proceedings to enforce 
the lien and establish defendant's good faith with respect 
thereto, if they constitute a binding adjudication of the 
facts found. With respect to defendant's claim of a lien 
based on the l.O.U., however, the only finding necessary to 
sustain the trial court's jUdgment adverse to defendant was 
the finding that the writing was insufficient to create a 
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standing of defendant and plaintiff's husband were unneces-
sary to the judgment, and since defendant was the prevailing 
party to the cause of action based on the I.O.U., she could 
not have attacked the unnecessary findings adverse to her on 
appeal. [17] Under these circumstances the findings are 
]]ot res judicata (Ohapman v. Hughes, 134 Cal. 641, 654-
655 [58 P. 298, 60 P. 974, 66 P. 982]; Natural Soda Prodtucts 
00. v. Oity of Los Angeles, 109 Ca1.App.2d 440, 445-446 [240 
P.2d 993]; see 3 Witkin, Cal.Proc., p. 1953), and can-
not overcome plaintiff's express allegation that defendant 
"well knew that he . . . had no right, title, estate or in-
terest in or to the aforementioned real property .••. " 
Even if it were assumed, however, that defendant had 
probable cause to assert a claim to the property based on 
the LO.U., it would not follow that plaintiff has failed to 
state a cause of action. In the former action defendant also 
asserted a claim to the property based on the theory of a 
fraudulent conveyance, and with respect to this cause of 
action there was no finding whether or not plaintiff's husband 
was insolvent at the time the joint tenancy was created. 
Thus, there is nothing in the findings in the former action 
contrary to plaintiff's allegations that defendant asserted a 
claim based on an alleged fraudulent conveyance with knowl-
edge of the falsity of the facts necessary to sustain it. In 
Singleton v. Perry, 45 Ca1.2d 489, 497 [289 P.2d 794], we 
held that a defendant cannot escape liability for the malicious 
prosecution of an unjustified charge by joining with it a 
justified charge, and that in such a case, the plaintiff does not 
have the burden of "showing that her damage was specifically 
attributable to the malicious prosecution as opposed to the 
prosecution which . . . was not malicious." 
Since the complaint states a cause of action for malicious 
prosecution, it was error to sustain defendant's objection to 
the introduction of evidence. 
The judgment is reversed. Each side to bear its own costs 
on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
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